India–Israel relations 2.0 – Prime Minister Narendra Modi addressing the Israeli Knesset in Jerusalem during his 2026 visit, highlighting security, technology and West Asia diplomacyPrime Minister Narendra Modi’s 2026 address to the Israeli Knesset signals a new phase in India–Israel relations 2.0, deepening strategic, tech and diplomatic engagement in a turbulent West Asia

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s historic address to the Israeli Knesset on 25 February 2026 marks a new phase in India–Israel relations 2.0 – deeper strategic alignment on security and technology, but underlined by India’s need to balance ties amid rising tensions in the West Bank and a volatile West Asia order.

From Hesitant Ties to Strategic Partnership

India recognised Israel in 1950, but for decades kept the relationship low-profile due to domestic sensitivities and solidarity with the Palestinian cause. Full diplomatic relations came only in 1992, after the Cold War and the Madrid peace process, opening the door to defence, trade and tech cooperation. Since the mid-2010s, especially after Modi’s first visit to Israel in 2017, ties have transformed into a broad strategic partnership covering defence, innovation, agriculture, water and people-to-people linkages.

Economically, bilateral trade rose from about 200 million dollars in 1992 to over 10.7 billion dollars in 2022–23, before falling to 6.5 billion dollars in 2023–24 and 3.6 billion dollars in 2024–25 due to war-related disruptions and trade-route troubles. Defence has been the bedrock: between 2014 and 2024, India accounted for more than 38% of Israel’s arms exports, making it one of Israel’s largest defence clients. At the same time, India has consistently supported a two-state solution and recently joined over 100 countries at the UN in criticising Israel’s settlement expansion in the West Bank, signalling that support for Israel does not mean abandoning Palestinian concerns.

Modi’s Knesset Speech: Core Themes

1. Security, Counterterrorism and the “Axis of Evil”

Modi’s speech framed Israel as “a protective wall against barbarism” and condemned the Hamas attack of 7 October 2023 in stark moral terms. He told Israeli lawmakers that he carried “the deepest condolences of the people of India” for every life lost in the “barbaric terrorist attack by Hamas,” positioning India firmly on the side of Israel in the current phase of the conflict. He went further, describing the post-October 7 struggle as a confrontation with a “jihadist axis of evil” that would either “break us, or we will break it – and we are breaking it,” aligning India rhetorically with Israel’s wider fight against Iran-backed and Muslim Brotherhood-linked networks.

Netanyahu responded by calling for an “iron alliance” of states “in the face of extremist Islam,” explicitly placing India inside a regional and global security framework Israel is trying to construct. In practice, this builds on existing defence cooperation – Israel is the fourth-largest supplier of military hardware to India, and the two sides are already working on joint production and technology transfer in line with “Make in India.” The speech thus signals that security cooperation is no longer just transactional arms trade, but part of a shared narrative about counterterrorism and regional stability.

2. Technology, Innovation and Economic Corridors

Beyond security, Modi and Netanyahu highlighted technology and innovation as central pillars of India–Israel relations 2.0. Netanyahu noted that trade has doubled and cooperation “tripled” in recent years, particularly in high-tech, agriculture, water and digital sectors, even if some details “probably shouldn’t [be] describe[d],” hinting at sensitive strategic tech projects. Israel’s cumulative FDI into India has crossed 347 million dollars since 2000, with over 300 investments mainly in technology, while Indian firms have invested about 443 million dollars in Israeli tech, cybersecurity, agriculture, water management and electric mobility.

The IMEC (India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor) idea also featured, as Netanyahu stressed that this US-backed maritime–land corridor linking India to Europe via the Middle East can only work if it runs through “stable and secure countries,” and that “there are no stronger and more secure countries on this axis than India and Israel.” For India, coupling tech collaboration with connectivity projects elevates the relationship from bilateral trade to a shared economic–strategic architecture spanning the Arabian Sea and Eastern Mediterranean.

3. Diaspora, Mobility and People-to-People Links

Modi’s speech also tapped into civilisational narratives, with Netanyahu praising India as a civilisation where “Jews were never persecuted by the state, only welcomed,” and vowing “we don’t forget that.” This historical memory underpins a soft-power bridge between Indian and Jewish communities, reinforcing political warmth with cultural affinity. Modi’s conclusion – invoking “Am Yisrael Chai” and “Jai Hind” together – symbolically fused the two national narratives before a cheering Knesset.

On the ground, movement of people between the two countries has grown substantially. Around 32,715 Indians travelled to Israel in 2024, up from about 27,196 in 2023. Approximately 32,000 Indian workers were in Israel by October 2024, many recruited after the Gaza conflict to replace Palestinian labour in construction, alongside around 900 Indian students studying in Israeli institutions. This labour and education linkage turns the relationship into a lived experience for thousands of Indians and Israelis, but also ties India more tightly into the social and economic fabric of Israel at a politically sensitive time.

4. Geopolitics, Gaza and the Palestine Question

Crucially, Modi’s speech did not ignore the wider Palestinian issue and regional diplomacy. He endorsed the Trump administration’s comprehensive Gaza peace plan, saying it “holds the promise of a just and durable peace for all the people of the region, including by addressing the Palestine issue.” The plan’s current phase envisions demilitarisation of Gaza, disarmament of Hamas and a gradual withdrawal of Israeli forces, though implementation remains uncertain and Israeli officials doubt whether Hamas can be disarmed without major IDF action.

This comes just as India joined more than 100 countries in a joint UN statement criticising Israel’s settlement moves in the West Bank, after initially holding back from such collective condemnation. Modi’s visit “shortly after” that move underscores the balancing act: New Delhi is willing to publicly back Palestinian rights in multilateral fora, yet signal unwavering solidarity with Israel on core security concerns and accept a central role in a US-led Gaza peace framework. In essence, India is trying to position itself as both a trusted Israeli partner and a credible voice in the broader Arab and Muslim world.

Economic, Defence and Labour Ties: The New Backbone

Trade and Investment

Bilateral trade patterns reveal how the economic relationship has diversified and yet remains concentrated in a few key sectors. From 2019–2025, refined petroleum products made up nearly 44% of India’s exports to Israel, with diamonds accounting for about 22%, while imports from Israel are dominated by diamonds, mineral and chemical fertilisers, electronic integrated circuits and radar apparatus. India has maintained a trade surplus with Israel since 2014–15, peaking at 6.1 billion dollars in 2022–23 and then narrowing sharply to 663 million dollars by 2024–25, reflecting both geopolitical shocks and the volatility of the energy and diamond trades.

Israel’s FDI into India, at 347 million dollars, and India’s 443 million dollars of ODI into Israel may look modest compared to larger partners, but they are highly strategic – concentrated in technology, cybersecurity, water, agriculture and mobility solutions that feed directly into India’s development priorities. This fits neatly with “Make in India,” as Israeli firms collaborate with Indian partners to manufacture equipment locally, particularly in defence and high-tech.

Defence and Strategic Technology

Defence remains the cornerstone of the partnership, both in volume and sensitivity. Between 2014 and 2024, more than 38% of Israel’s arms exports went to India, covering air defence systems, missiles, UAVs, sensors and electronic warfare suites. The July 2025 visit of Israel’s Defence Ministry Director General Amir Baram to India aimed explicitly at deepening industrial cooperation with Indian defence firms, while high-level political visits have consistently featured defence industry delegations.

Ongoing negotiations over a free trade agreement (FTA) have revealed frictions – India is pushing hard to include provisions on foreign workers, while Israel worries about losing control over inflows and domestic political resistance from middlemen who profit from current labour arrangements. But neither side seems willing to let disagreements on the FTA or domestic turbulence derail the expanding defence and tech relationship, as reflected in the warmth of the Knesset ceremony and Netanyahu’s description of Modi as “more than a friend, a brother.”

Migration, Labour and Domestic Politics

The sharp increase in Indian workers in Israel, especially in construction after Palestinian labour was curtailed, is both an opportunity and a risk for India. It provides jobs and remittances, and strengthens leverage with Israel, but also exposes Indian citizens to security threats and potential political backlash at home if casualties rise or labour conditions become controversial. The fact that India is simultaneously part of a UN statement critical of Israel’s West Bank policy shows New Delhi’s attempt to insulate its labour and economic interests from its normative position on occupation and settlements.

In Israel, Modi’s visit played into domestic political theatre: opposition MKs walked out during the Knesset Speaker’s and Netanyahu’s speeches to protest the exclusion of the High Court president, only to return for Modi’s address to avoid insulting the Indian leader. This underlines another reality of India–Israel relations 2.0: the relationship is robust enough to ride out each side’s internal political dramas, because the strategic convergence is now seen as long-term and bipartisan.

What Modi’s Visit Means for West Asia Diplomacy

Modi’s second Israel visit – and especially his Knesset speech – sends several messages to the West Asia region.

    • India is consolidating as a key extra-regional security partner: By backing Israel’s fight against Hamas in such explicit language, and by being woven into talk of an “iron alliance” against extremist Islam, India is signalling that it is willing to be part of the security geometry around Israel, Iran and the Gulf, not just a neutral economic player.
    • Yet India is not abandoning the Palestine file: India’s endorsement of a Gaza peace plan that explicitly promises a “just and durable peace” and addresses the Palestine issue, combined with its UN criticism of West Bank settlement expansion, shows New Delhi still wants credibility in Ramallah, Riyadh and Tehran.
    • Economic corridors are the new battleground: By aligning with IMEC and coupling it with India–Israel tech cooperation, New Delhi and Jerusalem are promoting a connectivity vision that competes with other regional initiatives, including Chinese-backed routes and traditional Gulf-centric energy corridors.
    • A calibrated tilt in a polarised region: As US President Donald Trump’s administration pushes hard on Iran and pursues a robust Gaza demilitarisation agenda, Israel is seeking reliable partners who will not waver under Western or regional pressure. Modi’s rhetoric in the Knesset places India firmly among such partners, even as New Delhi tries to avoid being drawn into any future US–Iran or Israel–Iran confrontation that could disrupt its energy supplies and diaspora interests.
    • Space for mediation, but with constraints: India’s unique position – good ties with Israel, the US, the Gulf monarchies and Iran – theoretically gives it room for a diplomatic role in de-escalation. However, the sharper pro-Israel tone of Modi’s speech may narrow perceptions of India’s neutrality among some Arab and Muslim actors, even if New Delhi’s voting record and statements on Palestine remain more balanced.

In sum, Modi’s Knesset address crystallises India–Israel relations 2.0 as a multidimensional partnership rooted in security, technology and people-to-people ties, but carefully hedged by a continued commitment to Palestinian rights and regional stability. For West Asia diplomacy, it confirms India as an increasingly consequential power – not just balancing between camps, but selectively shaping the emerging regional order.

By KumarDilip

Kumar Dilip is a digital content manager, SEO specialist, and editor based in Ranchi, Jharkhand, India. With expertise in creating high-quality, original news and editorial content on current affairs, politics, and defense topic. Content Expertise Kumar Dilip produces valuable, researched posts in English and Hindi, focusing on international and national news to inform readers effectively.

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